

BENJAMIN A. BROOKS

CONTACT

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Citizenship: U.S.

EMPLOYMENT

PROFESSOR, 2024–
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 2022–2024
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, 2016–2022
Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics, University of Chicago

VISITING ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 2023
Department of Economics, Stanford University

RESEARCH SCHOLAR, 2014–2016
Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago

EDUCATION

PH.D. IN ECONOMICS, June 2014
Committee chairs: Dilip Abreu and Stephen Morris
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

M.A. IN ECONOMICS, 2010
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

B.A. IN MATHEMATICS AND QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS, Magna Cum Laude, 2008
Tufts University, Medford, MA

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Microeconomic theory, mechanism design, auctions, repeated games, computational game theory.

PUBLICATIONS

THE LIMITS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris, *The American Economic Review*, 2015.

FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS WITH GENERAL INFORMATION STRUCTURES,
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris, *Econometrica*, 2017.

- CULTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO LEARNING TO COOPERATE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF HIGH- AND LOW-CASTE MEN IN RURAL INDIA,
with Karla Hoff and Priyanka Pandey, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 2018.
- REVENUE GUARANTEE EQUIVALENCE,
with Stephen Morris and Dirk Bergemann, *The American Economic Review*, 2019.
- AN ALGORITHM FOR STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH PERFECT MONITORING,
with Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov, *Econometrica*, 2020.
- COUNTERING THE WINNER’S CURSE: OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN IN A COMMON VALUE MODEL,
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris, *Theoretical Economics*, 2020.
- OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN WITH COMMON VALUES: AN INFORMATIONALLY ROBUST APPROACH,
with Songzi Du, *Econometrica*, 2021.
- SEARCH, INFORMATION, AND PRICES,
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris, *The Journal of Political Economy*, 2021.
- COUNTERFACTUALS WITH LATENT INFORMATION,
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris, *The American Economic Review*, 2022.
- INFORMATION HIERARCHIES,
with Alex Frankel and Emir Kamenica, *Econometrica*, 2022.
- A CANONICAL GAME – 75 YEARS IN THE MAKING – SHOWING THE EQUIVALENCE OF MATRIX GAMES AND LINEAR PROGRAMMING,
with Philip J. Reny, *Economic Theory Bulletin*, 2023.
- COMPARISONS OF SIGNALS,
with Alex Frankel and Emir Kamenica, *The American Economic Review*, 2024.
- ON THE STRUCTURE OF INFORMATIONALLY ROBUST OPTIMAL MECHANISMS,
with Songzi Du, *Econometrica*, 2024.
- ON THE STRUCTURE OF INFORMATIONALLY ROBUST OPTIMAL MECHANISMS,
with Songzi Du, *Econometrica*, 2024.
- REPRESENTING TYPE SPACES AS SIGNAL ALLOCATIONS,
with Alex Frankel and Emir Kamenica, *Economic Theory Bulletin*, 2024.
- ON THE ALIGNMENT OF CONSUMER SURPLUS AND TOTAL SURPLUS UNDER COMPETITIVE PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris, *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 2025.

WORKING PAPERS

- DUAL REDUCTIONS AND THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH FOR INFORMATIONALLY ROBUST MECHANISM DESIGN,
with Songzi Du.

AN INFORMATIONALLY ROBUST MARKET MODEL OF PERFECT COMPETITION,
with Songzi Du and Linchen Zhang.

COMPOUND PROPORTIONAL AUCTIONS,
with Songzi Du and Joey Feffer.

ROBUST MECHANISMS FOR THE FINANCING OF PUBLIC GOODS,
with Songzi Du.

MAXMIN AUCTION DESIGN WITH KNOWN EXPECTED VALUES,
with Songzi Du.

INFORMATIONALLY ROBUST OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN,
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris.

SURVEYING AND SELLING: BELIEF AND SURPLUS EXTRACTION IN AUCTIONS
REVENUE SHARING IN SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS

TEACHING

ECON 20700 Game Theory and Economic Applications

ECON 20770 Decision and Strategy

ECON 20780 Decision and Strategy II

ECON 30200 Price Theory II

ECON 30510 Topics in Economic Theory

ECON 49700 Required Research Seminar

HONORS AND AWARDS

NSF # 2215259, “Collaborative Research: New Informationally Robust Approaches to Mechanism Design and Games of Incomplete Information,” with Songzi Du, 2022–2025

NSF # 1757222, “Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informational Robust Approach,” 2018-2021

NSF # 1530823, “Collaborative Research: New Algorithms for Computing Equilibria of Stochastic Games,” with Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov, 2015-2018

Excellence in Refereeing Award 2017, American Economic Review

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Associate Editor and Guest Editor, *American Economic Review: Insights*, 2022–

Associate Editor, *Theoretical Economics*, 2023–

Co-editor, *Economic Theory*, 2023–

Editorial board, *Economic Theory*, 2021–

ACM EC Program Committee, 2019, 2021–2023

Area chair, 2021–2023

Econometric Society North American Winter Meetings, Program Committee, 2024

Program committee for the 7th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 2024

Program committee for SAET, 2023

Member of the Econometric Society, the American Economic Association

Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, 2024

Referee for *The American Economic Review*, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *The Review of Economic Studies*, *The International Journal of Game Theory*, *Econometrica*, *The Journal of Political Economy*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *The RAND Journal of Economics*, *Theoretical Economics*, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *Economic Theory*, *National Science Foundation*, *Discrete and Applied Mathematics*, *Mathematics of Operations Research*.

Last updated: January 10, 2025