Ben Brooks

Department of Economics
University of Chicago

babrooks@uchicago.edu (email)

Working papers


Selling to Intermediaries:
Optimal auction design in a common value model




Informationally robust optimal auction design



A "pencil sharpening" algorithm for two-player
stochastic games with perfect monitoring



Surveying and selling: Belief and surplus extraction in auctions


Revenue sharing in second-price auctions


Culture and the Efficiency of Coordination:
Experiments with High- and Low-Caste Men in Rural India



Publications


The limits of price discrimination

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
American Economic Review, 2015
Download Online appendix


First price auctions with general information structures:
Implications for bidding and revenue



with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
Econometrica, 2017
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An earlier version with discrete values and more results on “known values” and inefficient equilibria.

An even earlier version with additional results on binary values.