Ben Brooks

Department of Economics
University of Chicago (email)

Working papers

Selling to Intermediaries:
Optimal auction design in a common value model

Informationally robust optimal auction design

A "pencil sharpening" algorithm for two-player
stochastic games with perfect monitoring

Surveying and selling: Belief and surplus extraction in auctions

Revenue sharing in second-price auctions

Culture and the Efficiency of Coordination:
Experiments with High- and Low-Caste Men in Rural India


The limits of price discrimination

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
American Economic Review, 2015
Download Online appendix

First price auctions with general information structures:
Implications for bidding and revenue

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
Econometrica, 2017

An earlier version with discrete values and more results on “known values” and inefficient equilibria.

An even earlier version with additional results on binary values.